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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
abnormality in the child's family situation over which the child has no
control. A result occurred, certainly not so serious, but in kind like the
older practice of requiring that vital statistics records label an illegitimate
child as such.
In Marlin v. Board of Election of Cuyahoga County' it was held that in
the absence of specific allegations of fraud an elector could not use the in-
junctive process to prevent a candidate's name from being placed on the
ballot where he had not availed himself of the protest process provided in
Ohio Revised Code Section 3513.05.
The court in Henie v. City of Euclid'0 decided that when a property
owner sought to require the issuance of a building permit it was proper to
seek a mandatory injunction without complying with the administrative
procedure provided by ordinance when plaintiff's action was based on the
contention that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutional.
EDGAR I. KING
EVIDENCE
Two actions for personal injuries, involving the rule of res ipsa loquitur,
were reviewed by the supreme court and in each case it was held that before
the rule can be applied against a defendant-manufaGturer of the instru-
mentality causing the injury, there must be a showing that it could not have
been mishandled or tampered with between the time of -its leaving the
custody of the defendant-manufacturer and the time of the occurrence caus-
ing the injury. In Krupar v. Procter and Gamble Co.,' plaintiff purchased
a bar of soap from a retail grocer. While taking a bath, he suffered injury
when scratched on his hip by a small piece of wire which was embedded
in the partially consumed bar of soap. The evidence showed that the soap
had been used by plaintiff, his wife and guests for a period of eight days
after purchase from the retailer. The latter had some time previously pur-
chased the soap from defendant-manufacturer in another city and had had
it shipped to his warehouse for storage until needed. Reversing a judg-
ment for plaintiff entered by the court of appeals, the supreme court rend-
ered final judgment for defendant.
In Koktavy v. United Fireworks Mfg., Co.," plaintiff recovered a judg-
ment against defendant-manufacturer for injuries sustained by him re-
sulting from the premature explosion of an aerial salute bomb which he
had purchased from a retail jobber, who, in turn, had purchased -it from
119 N.E.2d 84 (Ohio App. 1954).
"118 N.E.2d 682 (Ohio App. 1954).
(Spring
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the defendant-manufacturer. The bomb had been out of the latter's custody,
control and management for approximately two months and had been lying
loose in the retail jobber's warehouse. No evidence was introduced by
plaintiff as to non-access to the bomb by others or as to the condition of the
warehouse. Moreover, after plaintiff had purchased the bomb, he trans-
ported it some forty miles in his automobile, stored it for five days in a
building and then had fired it from a mortar - with which defendant had
nothing to do - made of cast iron which was rusted and pitted. The court
of common pleas directed a verdict for defendant and judgment was entered
thereon. This was reversed by the court of appeals. The supreme court re-
versed the judgment of the court of appeals and affirmed that of com-
mon pleas court.
Another decision3 has been added to the growing list which concerns
privileged communications. An action for personal injury was instituted
by a passenger of one of the Cleveland Transit System's busses involved in
an accident. The operator of the bus obtained -the name and address of
the driver of -the other vehicle which collided with the bus, and the license
number thereof. Pursuant to custom, the operator turned over his in-
formation to the legal department of the Transit System. To obtain this
information, plaintiff took the deposition of an assistant superintendent of
the System's claim department, who refused to divulge the same and was
committed for contempt. Approving several of its, earlier decisions, the
supreme court held that the witness was justified in refusing to disclose
the information sought and discharged him from the custody of the sheriff.
The most interesting feature of the case, however, is the dissenting opinion
of Judge Hart in which he discusses at some length the previous decisions of
the court touching this question.
Tally v. Mahoning Exp. Co.,4 was an action for personal injury. Plaintiff
recovered a judgment for $60,000.00. Three physicians called by plaintiff
testified to his injuries and to his physical condition at the time of trial.
Two of them testified that further treatment was necessary, but did not ex-
plain the nature, duration, or probable cost thereof. Over objection of de-
fendant, plaintiff himself was permitted to give his opinion of such matters.
The supreme court held this prejudicial error since plaintiff, a mere lay-
man, did not possess the necessary learning, skill, or experience to enable
him to give an opinion. The court plainly stated that only one who has
expert knowledge of medicine or hospitalization could possibly testify with-
in -the range of probability on such subjects. However, the court, while re-
'160 Ohio St. 489, 117 N.E.2d 7 (1954).
2160 Ohio St 461, 117 N.E.2d 16 (1954).
'In re Tichy, 161 Ohio St. 104, 118 N.E.2d 128 (1954).
' 161 Ohio St. 457, 119 N.E.2d 831 (1954).
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